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Australian Constitution |
Herausgeber: Rechtsanwalt Möbius |
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Chapter I The Parliament |
German attorney at law |
Part I General
Section 1 [Federal Parliament]
The
legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal
Parliament
A
Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty's
representative in the Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the
Commonwealth during the Queen's pleasure, but subject to this
Constitution, such powers and functions of the Queen as Her Majesty may be
pleased to assign to him.
There
shall be payable to the Queen out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the
Commonwealth, for the salary of the Governor-General, an annual sum which,
until the Parliament otherwise provides, shall be ten thousand pounds. The
salary of a Governor-General shall not be altered during his continuance
in office.
The provisions of
this Constitution relating to the Governor-General extend and apply to the
Governor-General for the time being, or such person as the Queen may
appoint to administer the Government of the Commonwealth; but no such
person shall be entitled to receive any salary from the Commonwealth in
respect of any other office during his administration of the Government of
the Commonwealth.
(1) The
Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the sessions of the
Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by
Proclamation or otherwise, prorogue the Parliament, and may in like manner
dissolve the House of Representatives.
(2) After any general election
the Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than thirty days after
the day appointed for the return of the writs.
(3) The Parliament shall
by summoned to meet not later than six months after the establishment of
the Commonwealth.
There shall be
a session of the Parliament once at least in every year, so that twelve
months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the Parliament in
one session and its first sitting in the next session.
(1) The Senate shall
be composed of senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of
the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise provides, as one
electorate.
(2) But until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise
provides, the Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that State be an
Original State, may make laws dividing the State into divisions and
determining the number of senators to be chosen for each division, and in
the absence of such provision the State shall be one electorate.
(3)
Until the Parliament otherwise provides there shall be six senators for
each Original State. The Parliament may make laws increasing or
diminishing the number of senators for each State, but so that equal
representation of the several Original States shall be maintained and that
no Original State shall have less than six senators.
(4) The senators
shall be chosen for a term of six years, and the names of the senators
chosen for each State shall be certified by the Governor to the
Governor-General.
The
qualification of electors of senators shall be in each State that which is
prescribed by this Constitution, or by the Parliament, as the
qualification for electors of members of the House of Representatives; but
in the choosing of senators each elector shall vote only once.
(1) The
Parliament of the Commonwealth may make laws prescribing the method of
choosing senators, but so that the method shall be uniform for all the
States. Subject to any such law, the Parliament of each State may make
laws prescribing the method of choosing the senators for that
State.
(2) The Parliament of a State may make laws for determining the
times and places of elections of senators for the State.
Until the
Parliament otherwise provides, but subject to this Constitution, the laws
in force in each State, for the time being, relating to elections for the
more numerous House of the Parliament of the State shall, as nearly as
practicable, apply to elections of senators for the State.
The Senate
may proceed to the despatch of business, notwithstanding the failure of
any State to provide for its representation in the Senate.
The Governor of
any State may cause writs to be issued for elections of senators for the
State. In case of the dissolution of the Senate the writs shall be issued
within ten days from the proclamation of such dissolution.
(1) As soon as may be
after the Senate first meets, and after each first meeting of the Senate
following a dissolution thereof, the Senate shall divide the senators
chosen for each State into two classes, as nearly equal in number as
practicable; and the places of the senators of the first class shall
become vacant at the expiration of three yearst and the places of those of
the second class at the expiration of six yearst, from the beginning of
their term of service; and afterwards the places of senators shall become
vacant at the expiration of six years from the beginning of their term of
service.
(2) The election to fill vacant places shall be made within
one year before the places are to become vacant.
(3) For the purposes
of this section the term of service of a senator shall be taken to begin
on the first day of July following the day of his election, except in the
cases of the first election and of the election next after any dissolution
of the Senate, when it shall be taken to begin on the first day of July
preceding the day of his election.
Whenever
the number of senators for a State is increased or diminished, the
Parliament of the Commonwealth may make such provision for the vacating of
the places of senators for the State as it deems necessary to maintain
regularity in the rotation.
(1) If the place of
a senator becomes vacant before the expiration of his term of service, the
Houses of Parliament of the State for which he was chosen, sitting and
voting together or, if there is only one House of that Parliament, that
House, shall choose a person to hold the place until the expiration of the
term, or until the election of a successor as hereinafter provided
whichever first happens. But if the Parliament of the State is not in
session when the vacancy is notified, the Governor of the State, with the
advice of the Executive Council thereof, may appoint a person to hold the
place until the expiration of fourteen days from the beginning of the next
session of the Parliament of the State, or the expiration of the term,
whichever first happens.
(2) Where a vacancy has at any time occurred
in the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State and at the time
when he was so chosen, he was publicly recognized by a particular
political party as being an endorsed candidate of that party and publicly
represented himself to be such a candidate, a person chosen or appointed
under this section in consequence of that
vacancy, or in consequence of
that vacancy and a subsequent vacancy or vacancies, shall, unless there is
no member of that party available to be chosen or appointed, be a member
of that party.
(3) Where - (a) in accordance with the last preceding
paragraph, a member of a particular political party is chosen or appointed
to hold the place of a senator whose place had become vacant; and
(b)
before taking his seat he ceases to be a member of that party (otherwise
than by reason of the party having ceased to exist), he shall he deemed
not to have been so chosen or appointed and the vacancy shall be again
notified in accordance with Section
(4) The name of any senator chosen or appointed under
this section shall be certified by the Governor of the State to the
Governor-General.
(5) If the place of a senator chosen by the people of
a State at the election of senators last held before the commencement of
the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual] Vacancies) 1977 became vacant
before that commencement and, at the commencement, no person chosen by the
House or Houses of Parliament of the State, or appointed by the Governor
of the State, in consequence of that
vacancy or in consequence of that
vacancy and a subsequent vacancy or vacancies, held office, this section
applies as if the place of the senator chosen by the people of the State
had become vacant after that commencement.
(6) A senator holding office
at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual
Vacancies) 1977, being a senator appointed by the Governor of a State in
consequence of a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a
senator chosen by the people of the State, shall be deemed to have been
appointed to hold the place until the expiration of fourteen days after
the beginning of the next session of the Parliament of the State that
commenced or commences after he was appointed and further action under
this section shall be taken as if the vacancy in the place of the senator
chosen by the people of the State had occurred after that
commencement.
(7) Subject to the next succeeding paragraph, a senator
holding office at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate
Casual Vacancies) 1977 who was chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament
of a State in consequence of vacancy that had at any time occurred in the
place of a senator chosen by the people of the State shall he deemed to
have been chosen to hold office until the expiration of the term of
service of the senator elected by the people of the State.
(8) If, at
or before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual
Vacancies) 1977, a law to alter the Constitution entitled "Constitution
Alteration (Simultaneous Elections) 1977" came into operation, a senator
holding office at the commencement of that law who was chosen by the House
or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at
any time occurred in the place of a Senator chosen by the people of the
State shall be deemed to have been chosen to hold office -
(a) if the
senator elected by the people of the State had a term of service expiring
on the thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight
- until the expiration or dissolution of the first House of
Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that law came into
operation; or
(b) if the senator elected by the people of the State had
a term of service expiring on the thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine
hundred and eighty-one - until the expiration or dissolution of the second
House of Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that law came
into operation or, if there is an earlier dissolution of the Senate, until
that dissolution.
The
qualifications of a senator shall be the same as those of a member of the
House of Representatives.
(1)
The Senate shall, before proceeding to the despatch of any other business,
choose a senator to be the President of the Senate; and as often as the
office of President becomes vacant the Senate shall again choose a senator
to be the President.
(2) The President shall cease to hold his office
if he ceases to be a senator. He may be removed from office by a vote of
the Senate, or he may resign his office or his seat by writing addressed
to the Governor-General.
Before or
during any absence of the President, the Senate may choose a senator to
perform his duties in his absence.
A
senator may, by writing addressed to the President or to the
Governor-General if there is no President or if the President is absent
from the Commonwealth, resign his place, which thereupon shall become
vacant.
The place of a senator shall become vacant if for two
consecutive months of any session of the Parliament he, without the
permission of the Senate, fails to attend the Senate.
Whenever a vacancy happens in the Senate, the President,
or if there is no President or if the President is absent from the
Commonwealth the Governor-General, shall notify the same to the Governor
of the State in the representation of which the vacancy has happened.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the presence
of at least one-third of the whole number of the senators shall be
necessary to constitute a meeting of the Senate for the exercise of its
powers.
Questions
arising in the Senate shall be determined by a majority of votes, and each
senator shall have one vote. The President shall in all cases be entitled
to a vote; and when the votes are equal the question shall pass in the
negative.
(1)
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen
by the people of the Commonwealth, and the number of such members shall
be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the senators.
(2) The
number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to
the respective numbers of their people, and shall, until the Parliament
otherwise provides, be determined, whenever necessary, in the following
manner:
(i) A quota shall be ascertained by dividing the number of the
people of the Commonwealth, as shown by the latest statistics of the
Commonwealth, by twice the number the senators:
(ii) The number of
members to be chosen in each State shall be determined by dividing the
number of the people of the State, as shown by the latest statistics of
the Commonwealth, by the quota; and if on such division there is a
remainder greater than one-half of the quota, one more member shall be
chosen in the State.
(3) But notwithstanding anything in this section,
five members at least shall be chosen in each Original State.
For
the purposes of the last section, if by the law of any State all persons
of any race are disqualified from voting at elections for the more
numerous House of the Parliament of the State, then, in reckoning the
number of the people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of that
race resident in that State shall not be counted.
(1)
Notwithstanding anything in Section
New South Wales: 23
Victoria: 20
Queensland:
9
South Australia: 6
Tasmania: 5.
(2) Provided that if Western
Australia is an Original State, the numbers shall be as follows:
New
South Wales: 26
Victoria: 23
Queensland: 9
South Australia:
7
Western Australia: 5
Tasmania: 5.
Subject to this Constitution, the Parliament
may make laws for increasing or diminishing the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.
Every House of
Representatives shall continue for three years from the first meeting of
the House, and no longer, but may be sooner dissolved by the
Governor-General.
(1)
Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the
Parliament of any State may make laws for determining the divisions in
each State for which members of the House of Representatives may be
chosen, and the number of members to be chosen for each division. A
division shall not be formed out of parts of different States.
(2) In
the absence of other provision, each State shall be one electorate.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the
qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives shall
be in each State that which is prescribed by the law of the State as the
qualification of electors of the more numerous House of Parliament of the
State; but in the choosing of members each elector shall vote only once.
Until the
Parliament otherwise provides, but subject to this Constitution, the laws
in force in each State for the time being relating to elections for the
more numerous House of the Parliament of the State shall, as nearly as
practicable, apply to elections in the State of members of the House of
Representatives.
(1) The Governor-General in Council may cause writs
to be issued for general elections of members of the House of
Representatives.
(2) After the first general election, the writs shall
be issued within ten days from the expiry of a House of Representatives or
from the proclamation of a dissolution thereof.
Whenever a
vacancy happens in the House of Representatives, the Speaker shall issue
his writ for the election of a new member, or if there is no Speaker or if
he is absent from the Commonwealth the Governor-General in Council may
issue the writ.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the
qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives shall be as
follows:
(i) He must be of the full age of 21 years, and must be an
elector entitled to vote at the election of members of the House of
Representatives, or a person qualified to become such elector, and must
have been for three years at the least a resident within the limits of the
Commonwealth as existing at the time when he is chosen:
(ii) He must be
a subject of the Queen, either natural-born or for at least five years
naturalized under a law of the United Kingdom, or of a Colony which has
become or becomes a State, or of the Commonwealth, or of a State.
(1) The House of
Representatives shall, before proceeding to the despatch of any other
business, choose a member to be the Speaker of the House, and as often as
the office of Speaker becomes vacant the House shall again choose a member
to be the Speaker.
(2) The Speaker shall cease to hold his office if he
ceases to be a member. He may be removed from office by a vote of the
House, or he may resign his office or his seat by writing addressed to the
Governor-General.
Before or during
any absence of the Speaker, the House of Representatives may choose a
member to perform his duties in his absence.
A
member may by writing addressed to the Speaker, or to the Governor-General
if there is no Speaker or if the Speaker is absent from the Commonwealth,
resign his place, which thereupon shall become vacant.
The place of a member shall become vacant if
for two consecutive months of any session of the Parliament he, without
the permission of the House, fails to attend the House.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the
presence of at least one-third of the whole number of the members of the
House of Representatives shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the
House for the exercise of its powers.
Questions arising in the House of
Representatives shall be determined by a majority of votes other than that
of the Speaker. The Speaker shall not vote unless the numbers are equal;
and then he shall have a casting vote.
No adult person
who has or acquires a right to vote at elections for the more numerous
House of the Parliament of a State shall, while the right continues, be
prevented by any law of the Commonwealth from voting at elections for
either House of the Parliament of the Commonwealth.
Every senator and every member of the House of
Representatives shall before taking his seat make and subscribe before the
Governor-General, or some person authorized by him, an oath or affirmation
of allegiance in the form set forth in the schedule to this Constitution.
A
member of either House of the Parliament shall be incapable of being
chosen or of sitting as a member of the other House.
(1)
Any person who - (i) Is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience,
or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled
to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power;
or
(ii) Is attained of treason, or has been convicted and is under
sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the
law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or
longer; or
(iii) Is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent; or
(iv)
Holds any office of profit under the Crown, or any pension payable during
the pleasure of the Crown out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth;
or
(v) Has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement
with the Public Service of the Commonwealth otherwise than as a member and
in common with the other members of an incorporated company consisting of
more than twenty-five persons:
shall be incapable of being chosen or of
sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.
(2)
But Sub-section iv does not apply to the office of any of the Queen's
Ministers of State for the Commonwealth, or of any of the Queen's
Ministers for a State, or to the receipt of pay, half pay, or a pension,
by any person as an officer or member of the Queen's navy or army, or to
the receipt of pay as an officer or member of the naval or military forces
of the Commonwealth by any person whose services are not wholly employed
by the Commonwealth.
If a senator or
member of the House of Representatives - (i) Becomes subject to any of the
disabilities mentioned in the last preceding section: or
(ii) Takes the
benefit, whether by assignment, composition, or otherwise, of any law
relating to bankrupt or insolvent debtors: or
(iii) Directly or
indirectly takes or agrees to take any fee or honorarium for services
rendered to the Commonwealth, or for services rendered in the Parliament
to any person or State:
his place shall thereupon become vacant.
Until the
Parliament otherwise provides, any person declared by this Constitution to
be incapable of sitting as a senator or as a member of the House of
Representatives shall, for every day on which he so sits, be liable to pay
the sum of one hundred pound to any person who sues for it in any court of
competent jurisdiction.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, any
question respecting the qualification of a senator or of a member of the
House of Representatives or respecting a vacancy in either House of the
Parliament, and any question of a disputed election to either House, shall
be determined by the House in which the question arises.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, each
senator and each member of the House of Representatives shall receive an
allowance of four hundred pounds a year, to be reckoned from the day on
which he takes his seat.
The powers, privileges, and immunities of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives, and of the members and the
committees of each House, shall be such as are declared by the Parliament,
and until declared shall be those of the Commons House of Parliament of
the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the
establishment of the Commonwealth.
Each House
of the Parliament may make rules and orders with respect to - (i) The mode
in which its powers, privileges, and immunities may be exercised and
upheld:
(ii) The order and conduct of its business and proceedings
either separately or jointly with the other House.
The
Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws
(i) Trade and
commerce with other countries, and among the States;
(ii) Taxation
(iii)
Bounties on the production or export of goods, but so that such bounties
shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth;
(iv) Borrowing money on
the public credit of the Commonwealth;
(v) Postal, telegraphic,
telephonic, and other like services;
(vi) The naval and military
defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of
the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth;
(vii)
Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys;
(viii) Astronomical and
meteorological observations;
(ix) Quarantine;
(x) Fisheries in
Australian waters beyond territorial limits;
(xi) Census and
statistics;
(xii) Currency, coinage, and legal tender;
(xiii)
Banking, other than State banking; also State banking extending beyond the
limits of the State concerned, the incorporation of banks, and the issue
of paper money;
(xiv) Insurance, other than State insurance; also State
insurance extending beyond the limits of the State concerned;
(xv)
Weights and measures;
(xvi) Bills of exchange and promissory
notes;
(xvii) Bankruptcy and insolvency;
(xviii) Copyrights, patents
of inventions and designs, and trade marks;
(xiv) Naturalization and
aliens;
(xx) Foreign corporations, and trading or financial
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth;
(xxi)
Marriage;
(xxii) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation
thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of
infants;
(xviii) Invalid and old-age pensions;
(xxiiiA) The
provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment,
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and
dental services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil
conscription), benefits to students and family allowances;
(xxiv) The
service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and
criminal process and the judgments of the courts of the States;
(xxv)
The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws, the public Acts
and records, and the judicial proceedings of the States;
(xxvi) The
people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special
laws;
(xxvii) Immigration and emigration;
(xxviii) The influx of
criminals;
(xxix) External affairs;
(xxx) The relations of the
Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific;
(xxxi) The acquisition of
property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect
of which the Parliament has power to make laws;
(xxxii) The control of
railways with respect to transport for the naval and military purposes of
the Commonwealth;
(xxxiii) The acquisition, with the consent of a
State, of any railways of the State on terms arranged between the
Commonwealth and the State;
(xxxiv) Railway construction and extension
in any State with the consent of that State;
(xxxv) Conciliation and
arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes
extending beyond the limits of any one State;
(xxxvi) Matters in
respect of which this Constitution makes provision until the Parliament
otherwise provides;
(xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of the
Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but
so that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the
matter is referred, or which afterwards adopt the law;
(xxxviii) The
exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence
of the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned, of any power
which can at the establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by
the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of
Australasia;
(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power
vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof,
or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal judicature, or
in any department or officer of the Commonwealth.
The
Parliament shall, subject to this constitution, have exclusive power to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth
with respect to - (i) The seat of government of the Commonwealth, and all
places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes:
(ii) Matters
relating to any department of the public service the control of which is
by this constitution transferred to the Executive Government of the
Commonwealth:
(iii) Other matters declared by this Constitution to be
within the exclusive power of the Parliament.
(1) Proposed laws
appropriating revenue or moneys, or imposing taxation, shall not originate
in the Senate. But a proposed law shall not be taken to appropriate
revenue or moneys, or to impose taxation, by reason only of its containing
provisions for the imposition or appropriation of fines or other pecuniary
penalties, or for the demand or payment or appropriation of fees for
licenses, or fees for services under the proposed law.
(2) The Senate
may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation, or proposed laws
appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the
Government.
(3) The Senate may not amend any proposed law so as to
increase any proposed charge or burden on the people.
(4) The Senate
may at any stage return to the House of Representatives any proposed law
which the Senate may not amend, requesting, by message, the omission or
amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the House of
Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make any of such omissions or
amendments, with or without modifications.
(5) Except as provided in
this section, the Senate shall have equal power with the House of
Representatives in respect of all proposed laws.
The
proposed law which appropriates revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual
services of the Government shall deal only with such appropriation.
(1) Laws imposing taxation shall deal only with the
imposition of taxation, and any provision therein dealing with any other
matter shall be of no effect.
(2) Laws imposing taxation, except laws
imposing duties of customs or of excise, shall deal with one subject of
taxation only; but laws imposing duties of customs shall deal with duties
of customs only, and laws imposing duties of excise shall deal with duties
of excise only.
A
vote, resolution, or proposed law for the appropriation of revenue or
moneys shall not be passed unless the purpose of the appropriation has in
the same session been recommended by message of the Governor-General to
the House in which the proposal originated.
(1) If
the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate
rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the
House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three
months the House of Representatives, in the same or the next session,
again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments which have
been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects
or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of
Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the
Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously. But such
dissolution shall not take place within six months before the date of the
expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time.
(2) If
after such dissolution the House of Representatives again passes the
proposed law, with or without any amendments which have been made,
suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to
pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of
Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may convene a joint
sitting of the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives.
(3) The members present at the joint sitting may
deliberate and shall vote together upon the proposed law as last proposed
by the House of Representatives, and upon amendments, if any, which have
been made therein by one House and not agreed to by the other, and any
such amendments which are affirmed by an absolute majority of the total
number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be
taken to have been carried, and if the proposed law, with the amendments,
if any, so carried is affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number
of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, it shall be
taken to have been duly passed by both Houses of the Parliament, and shall
be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent.
(1) When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the
Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent, he
shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to this
Constitution, that he assents in the Queen's name or that he withholds
assent, or that he reserves the law for the Queen's pleasure.
(2) The
Governor-General may return to the house in which it originated any
proposed law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any
amendments which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the
recommendation.
The Queen
may disallow any law within one year from the Governor-General's assent,
and such disallowance on being made known by the Governor-General by
speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by
Proclamation, shall annul the law from the day when the disallowance is so
made known.
A proposed law
reserved for the Queen's pleasure shall not have any force unless and
until within two years from the day on which it was presented to the
Governor-General for the Queen's assent the Governor-General makes known,
by speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by
Proclamation, that it has received the Queen's assent.
The
executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is
exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and
extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the
laws of the Commonwealth.
There shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise
the Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and the
members of the Council shall be chosen and summoned by the
Governor-General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and shall hold office
during his pleasure.<"courtxrzone4_.loop%525">
The provisions
of this Constitution referring to the Governor-General in council shall be
construed as referring to the Governor-General acting with the advice of
the Federal Executive Council.
(1) The
Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of
State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may
establish.
(2) Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of
the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive
Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the
Commonwealth.
(3) After the first general election, no Minister of
State shall hold office for a longer period than three months unless he is
or becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.
Until the
Parliament otherwise provides, the Ministers of State shall not exceed
seven in number, and shall hold such offices as the Parliament prescribes,
or, in the absence of provision, as the Governor-General directs.
There
shall be payable to the Queen, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the
Commonwealth, for the salaries of the Ministers of State, an annual sum
which, until the Parliament otherwise provides, shall not exceed twelve
thousand pounds a year.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the
appointment and removal of all other officers of the Executive Government
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the Governor-General in Council,
unless the appointment is delegated by the Governor-General in Council or
by a law of the Commonwealth to some other authority.
The command in chief of the naval and military forces
of the Commonwealth
(1) On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the
Governor-General after the establishment of the Commonwealth the following
departments of the public service in each state shall become transferred
to the Commonwealth:
- Posts, telegraphs, and telephones:
- Naval
and military defence:
- Lighthouses, lightships beacons and buoys:
-
Quarantine.
(2) But the departments of customs and of excise in each
State shall become transferred to the Commonwealth on its establishment.
In
respect of matters which, under this Constitution, pass to the Executive
Government of the Commonwealth, all powers and functions which at the
establishment of the Commonwealth are vested in the Governor of a Colony,
or in the Governor of a Colony with the advice of his Executive Council,
or in any authority of a Colony, shall vest in the Governor-General, or in
the Governor-General in Council, or in the authority exercising similar
powers under the Commonwealth, as the case requires.
The judicial power
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be
called the High Court of Australia
(1) The Justices of the High Court and of the other
courts created by the Parliament - (i) Shall be appointed by the
Governor-General in Council:
(ii) Shall not be removed except by the
Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the
Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of
proved misbehavior or incapacity:
(iii) Shall receive such remuneration
as the Parliament may fix; but the remuneration shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
(2) The appointment of a Justice of
the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the age of
seventy years and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of the High
Court if he has attained that age.
(3) The appointment of a Justice of
a court created by the Parliament shall be for a term expiring upon his
attaining the age that is, at the time of his appointment, the maximum age
for Justices of that court and a person shall not be appointed as a
Justice of such court if he has attained the age that is for the time
being the maximum age for Justices of that Court.
(4) Subject to this
section, the maximum age for Justices of any court created by the
Parliament is seventy years.
(5) The Parliament may make a law fixing
an age that is less than seventy years as the maximum age for Justices of
a court created by the Parliament and may at any time repeal or amend such
a law, but any such repeal or amendment does not affect the term of office
of a Justice under an appointment made before the repeal or
amendment.
(6) A Justice of the High Court or of a court created by the
Parliament may resign his office by writing under his hand delivered to
the Governor-General.
(7) Nothing in the provisions added to this
section by the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977 affects
the continuance of a person in office as a Justice of a court under an
appointment made before the commencement of those provisions.
(8) A
reverence in this section to the appointment of a Justice of the High
Court or of a court created by the Parliament shall be read as including a
reference to the appointment of a person who holds office as a Justice of
the High court or of a court created by the Parliament to another office
of Justice of the same court having a different status or designation.
(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such
exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes,
to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and
sentences - (i) Of any Justice or Justices exercising the original
jurisdiction of the High Court:
(ii) Of any other federal court, or
court exercising federal jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any
State, or of any other court of any State from which at the establishment
of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council:
(iii) Of
the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of law only:
and the
judgment of the High Court in all such cases shall be final and
conclusive.
(2) But no exception or regulation prescribed by the
Parliament shall prevent the High Court from hearing and determining any
appeal from the Supreme Court of a State in any matter in which at the
establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court
to the Queen in Council.
(3) Until the Parliament otherwise provides,
the conditions of and restrictions on appeals to the Queen in Council from
the Supreme Courts of the several States shall be applicable to appeals
from them to the High Court.
(1) No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council
from a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever arising, as
to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the
Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits
inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States,
unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one which ought
to be determined by Her Majesty in Council.
(2) The High Court may so
certify if satisfied that for any special reason the certificate should be
granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on
the question without further leave.
(3) Except as provided in this
section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen may
be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative to grant special
leave of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council. The
Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be
asked, but proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be reserved
by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's pleasure.
In all matters - (i) Arising under any treaty:
(ii)
Affecting consuls or other representatives of other countries:
(iii) In
which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the
Commonwealth, is a party:
(iv) Between States, or between residents of
different States, or between a State and a resident of another
State:
(v) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction
is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth:
the High Court shall
have original jurisdiction.
The Parliament may make laws conferring original
jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter - (i) Arising under this
Constitution, or involving its interpretation:
(ii) Arising under any
laws made by the Parliament:
(iii) Of Admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction:
(il ) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under
the laws of different States.
With respect to any of the matters mentioned in the
last two sections the Parliament may make laws - (i) Defining the
jurisdiction of any federal court other than the High Court:
(ii)
Defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall
be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the
States:
(iii) Investing any court of a State with federal jurisdiction.
The Parliament may make laws conferring rights to proceed
against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of matters within the
limits of the judicial power.
The federal
jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by such number of judges as the
Parliament prescribes.
The trial on
indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by
jury, and every such trial shall be held in the State where the offence
was committed, and if the offence was not committed within any State the
trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes.
All
revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive Government of the
Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be appropriated
for the purposes of the Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the
charges and liabilities imposed by this Constitution.
The costs, charges, and expenses incident to the
collection, management, and receipt of the Consolidated Revenue Fund shall
form the first charge thereon; and the revenue of the Commonwealth shall
in the first instance be applied to the payment of the expenditure of the
Commonwealth.
(1) No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of
the Commonwealth except under appropriation made by law.
(2) But until
the expiration of one month after the first meeting of the Parliament the
Governor-General in Council may draw from the Treasury and expend such
moneys as may be necessary for the maintenance of any department
transferred to the Commonwealth and for the holding of the first elections
for the Parliament.
(1) When
any department of the public service of a State becomes transferred to the
Commonwealth, all officers of the department shall become subject to the
control of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
(2) Any such
officer who is not retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall,
unless he is appointed to some other office of equal emolument in the
public service of the State, be entitled to receive from the State any
pension, gratuity, or other compensation, payable under the law of the
State on the abolition of his office.
(3) Any such officer who is
retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall preserve all his
existing and accruing rights, and shall be entitled to retire from office
at the time, and on the pension or retiring allowance, which would be
permitted by the law of the State if his service with the Commonwealth
were a continuation of his service with the State. Such pension or
retiring allowance shall be paid to him by the Commonwealth; but the State
shall pay to the Commonwealth a part thereof, to be calculated on the
proportion which his term of service with the State bears to his whole
term of service, and for the purpose of the calculation his salary shall
be taken to be that paid to him by the State at the time of the
transfer.
(4) Any officer who is, at the establishment of the
Commonwealth, in the public service of a State, and who is, by consent of
the Governor of the State with the advice of the Executive Council
thereof, transferred to the public service of the Commonwealth, shall have
the same rights as if he had been an officer of a department transferred
to the Commonwealth and were retained in the service of the Commonwealth.
When any
department of the public service of a State is transferred to the
Commonwealth - (i) All property of the State of any kind, used exclusively
in connection with the department, shall become vested in the
Commonwealth; but, in the case of the departments controlling customs and
excise and bounties, for such time only as the Governor-General in Council
may declare to be necessary:
(ii) The Commonwealth may acquire any
property of the State, of any kind used, but not exclusively used in
connection with the department; the value thereof shall, if no agreement
can be made, be ascertained in, as nearly as may be, the manner in which
the value of land, or of an interest in land, taken by the State for
public purposes is ascertained under the law of the State in force at the
establishment of the Commonwealth:
(iii) The Commonwealth shall
compensate the State for the value of any property passing to the
Commonwealth under this section; if no agreement can be made as to the
mode of compensation, it shall be determined under laws to be made by the
Parliament:
(iv) The Commonwealth shall, at the date of the transfer,
assume the current obligations of the State in respect of the department
transferred.
On the
establishment of the Commonwealth, the collection and control of duties of
customs and of excise, and the control of the payment of bounties, shall
pass to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
(1) During
a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and
thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides, of the net revenue of
the Commonwealth from duties of customs and of excise not more than
one-fourth shall be applied annually by the Commonwealth towards its
expenditure.
(2) The balance shall, in accordance with this
Constitution, be paid to the several States, or applied towards the
payment of interest on debts of the several States taken over by the
Commonwealth.
Uniform duties of customs shall be imposed within two
years after the establishment of the Commonwealth.
Until the imposition of uniform duties of customs
-
(i) The Commonwealth shall credit to each State the revenues
collected therein by the Commonwealth.
(ii) The Commonwealth shall
debit to each State -
(a) The expenditure therein of the Commonwealth
incurred solely for the maintenance or continuance, as at the time of
transfer, of any department transferred from the State to the
Commonwealth;
(b) The proportion of the State, according to the number
of its people in the other expenditure of the Commonwealth.
(iii) The
Commonwealth shall pay to each State month by month the balance (if any)
in favor of the State.
(1) On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the
power of the Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise, and to
grant bounties on the production or export of goods, shall become
exclusive.
(2) On the imposition of uniform duties of customs all laws
of the several States imposing duties of customs or of excise, or offering
bounties on the production or export of goods, shall cease to have effect,
but any grant of or agreement for any such bounty lawfully made by or
under the authority of the Government of any State shall be taken to be
good if made before the thirtieth day of June, one thousand eight hundred
and ninety-eight, and not otherwise.
Nothing in this Constitution prohibits a State from
granting any aid to or bounty on mining for gold, silver, or other metals,
nor from granting, with the consent of both Houses of the Parliament of
the Commonwealth expressed by resolution any aid to or bounty on the
production or export of goods.
(1) On the
imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse
among the states, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean
navigation, shall be absolutely free.
(2) But notwithstanding anything
in this Constitution, goods imported before the imposition of uniform
duties of customs into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst the
goods remain therein, becomes a State, shall, on thence passing into
another State within two years after the imposition of such duties, be
liable to any duty chargeable on the importation of such goods into the
Commonwealth, less any duty paid in respect of the goods on their
importation.
During the first five years after the imposition of
uniform duties of customs, and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise
provides - (i) The duties of customs chargeable on goods imported into a
State and afterwards passing into another State for consumption, and the
duties of excise paid on goods produced or manufactured in a State and
afterwards passing into another State for consumption, shall be taken to
have been collected not in the former but in the latter State:
(ii)
Subject to the last subsection, the Commonwealth shall credit revenue,
debit expenditure, and pay balances to the several States as prescribed
for the period preceding the imposition of uniform duties of customs.
After five years from the imposition of uniform duties
of customs, the Parliament may provide, on such basis as it deems fair,
for the monthly payment to the several States of all surplus revenue of
the Commonwealth.
(1)
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the Parliament of the State
of Western Australia, if that State be an Original State, may, during the
first five years after the imposition of uniform duties of customs, impose
duties of customs on goods passing into that State and not originally
imported from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth; and such duties shall
be collected by the Commonwealth.
(2) But any duty so imposed on any
goods shall not exceed during the first of such years the duty chargeable
on the goods under the law of Western Australia in force at the imposition
of uniform duties and shall not exceed during the second, third, fourth,
and fifth of such years respectively, four-fifths, three-fifths,
two-fifths, and one-fifth of such latter duty, and all duties imposed
under this section shall cease at the expiration of the fifth year after
the imposition of uniform duties.
(3) If at any time during the five
years the duty on any goods under this section is higher than the duty
imposed by the Commonwealth on the importation of the like goods, then
such higher duty shall be collected on the goods when imported into
Western Australia from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth.
During a period of ten years after the establishment of
the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides,
the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms
and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the laws in
force in any colony which has become or becomes a State with respect to
the receipt of revenue and the expenditure of money on account of the
Government of the Colony, and the review and audit of such receipt and
expenditure, shall apply to the receipt of revenue and the expenditure of
money on account of the Commonwealth in the State in the same manner as if
the Commonwealth, or the Government or an officer of the Commonwealth,
were mentioned whenever the Colony, or the Government or an officer of the
Colony is mentioned.
The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect
to trade and commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and to railways
the property of any State.
The
Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade, commerce or
revenue, give preference to one State or any part thereof over another
State or any part thereof.
The
Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or commerce,
abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the reasonable
use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation.
There
shall be an Inter-State Commission, with such powers of adjudication and
administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execution and
maintenance, within the Commonwealth, of the provisions of this
Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws made
thereunder.
The Parliament may by any law with respect to trade
or commerce forbid, as to railways, any preference or discrimination by
any State, or by any authority constituted under a State, if such
preference or discrimination is undue and unreasonable, or unjust to any
State; due regard being had to the financial responsibilities incurred by
any State in connection with the construction and maintenance of its
railways. But no preference or discrimination shall, within the meaning of
this section, be taken to be undue and unreasonable, or unjust to any
State, unless so adjudged by the Inter-State Commission.
The members of the Inter-State Commission - (i)
Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:
(ii) Shall hold
office for seven years, but may be removed within that time by the
Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the
Parliament in the same session praying for such removal on the ground of
proved misbehavior or incapacity:
(iii) Shall receive such remuneration
as the Parliament may fix; but such remuneration shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
Nothing in this
Constitution shall render unlawful any rate for the carriage of goods upon
a railway, the property of a State, if the rate is deemed by the
Inter-State Commission to be necessary for the development of the
territory of the State, and if the rate applies equally to goods within
the State and to goods passing into the State from other States.
The Parliament may take over from the States their
public debts, or a proportion thereof according to the respective numbers
of their people as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, and
may convert, renew, or consolidate such debts, or any part thereof; and
the States shall indemnify the Commonwealth in respect of the debts taken
over, and thereafter the interest payable in respect of the debts shall be
deducted and retained from the portions of the surplus revenue of the
Commonwealth payable to the several States, or if such surplus is
insufficient, or if there is no surplus, then the deficiency or the whole
amount shall be paid by the several States.
(1)
The Commonwealth may make agreements with the States with respect to the
public debts of the States including:
(a) the taking over of such debts
by the Commonwealth;
(b) the management of such debts;
(c) the
payment of interest and the provision and management of sinking funds in
respect of such debts;
(d) the consolidation, renewal, conversion, and
redemption of such debts;
(e) the indemnification of the Commonwealth
by the States in respect of debts taken over by the Commonwealth;
and
(f) the borrowing of money by the States or by the Commonwealth or
by the Commonwealth for the States.
(2) The Parliament may make laws
for validating any such agreement made before the commencement of this
section.
(3) The Parliament may make laws for the carrying out by the
parties thereto of any such agreement.
(4) Any such agreement may be
varied or rescinded by the parties thereto.
(5) Every such agreement
and any such variation thereof shall be binding upon the Commonwealth and
the States parties thereto notwithstanding anything contained in this
Constitution or the Constitution of the several States or in any law of
the Parliament of the Commonwealth or of any State.
(6) The powers
conferred by this section shall not be construed as being limited in any
way by the provisions of Section
The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth
shall, subject to this Constitution, continue as at the establishment of
the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as
the case may be, until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the
State.
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has
become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution
exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from
the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the
Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the
case may be.
Every law in force in a Colony which has become or
becomes a State, and relating to any matter within the powers of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this Constitution,
continue in force in the State; and until provision is made in that behalf
by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the Parliament of the State shall
have such powers of alteration and of repeal in respect of any such law as
the Parliament of the Colony had until the Colony became a State.
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the
extent of inconsistency, be invalid.
The provisions of this Constitution relating to the
Governor of a State extend and apply to the Governor for the time being of
the State, or other chief executive office or administrator of the
government of the State.
The Parliament of a State may surrender any part of the
State to the Commonwealth; and upon such surrender, and the acceptance
thereof by the Commonwealth, such part of the State shall become subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.
After uniform duties of customs have been imposed, a
State may levy on imports or exports, or on goods passing into or out of
the State, such charges as may be necessary for executing the inspection
laws of the State; but the net produce of all charges so levied shall be
for the use of the Commonwealth; and any such inspection laws may be
annulled by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.
All
fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquids passing into any State
or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage, shall be
subject to the laws of the State as if such liquids had been produced in
the State.
A
State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the
Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military force, or impose any
tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth, nor shall the
Commonwealth impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State.
A State shall not coin money, nor make anything but gold
and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts.
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing
any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting
the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required
as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.
A subject
of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other
State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally
applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other
State.
Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the
Commonwealth to the laws, the public acts and records, and the judicial
proceedings of every State.
The
Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the
application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic
violence.
Every State shall
make provision for the detention in its prisons of persons accused or
convicted of offences against the laws of the Commonwealth, and for the
punishment of persons convicted of such offences, and the Parliament of
the Commonwealth may make laws to give effect to this provision.
The Parliament may admit to the Commonwealth or
establish new States, and may upon such admission or establishment make or
impose such terms and conditions, including the extent of representation
in either House of the Parliament, as it thinks fit.
The Parliament may make laws for the government of
any territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by the
Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the Queen under the authority
of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or otherwise acquired by the
Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of such territory in either
House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms which it thinks
fit.
The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the
consent of the Parliament of a State, and the approval of the majority of
the electors of the State voting upon the question, increase, diminish, or
otherwise alter the limits of the State, upon such terms and conditions as
may be agreed on, and may, with the like consent, make provision
respecting the effect and operation of any increase or diminution or
alteration of territory in relation to any State affected.
A
new State may be formed by separation of territory from a State, but only
with the consent of the Parliament thereof, and a new State may be formed
by the union of two or more State
or parts of States, but only with the
consent of the Parliaments of the States affected.
(1) The
seat of Government of the Commonwealth shall be determined by the
Parliament, and shall be within territory which shall have been granted to
or acquired by the Commonwealth, and shall be vested in and belong to the
Commonwealth, and shall be in the State of New South Wales, and be distant
not less than one hundred miles from Sydney.
(2) Such territory shall
contain an area of not less than one hundred square miles, and such
portion thereof as shall consist of Crown lands shall be granted to the
Commonwealth without any payment therefor.
(3) The Parliament shall sit
at Melbourne until it meets at the seat of Government.
The Queen
may authorize the Governor-General to appoint any person, or any persons
jointly or severally, to be his deputy or deputies within any part of the
Commonwealth, and in that capacity to exercise during the pleasure of the
Governor-General such powers and functions of the Governor-General as he
thinks fit to assign to such deputy or deputies, subject to any
limitations expressed or directions given by the Queen; but the
appointment of such deputy or deputies shall not affect the exercise by
the Governor-General himself of any power or function.
This Constitution shall not be altered except in
the following manner:
(1) The proposed law for the alteration thereof
must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament,
and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through
both Houses the proposed law shall be submitted in each State and
Territory to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of
the House of Representatives.
(2) But if either House passes any such
proposed law by an absolute majority, and the other House rejects or fails
to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned
House will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the
first-mentioned House in the same or the next session again passes the
proposed law by an absolute majority with or without any amendment which
has been made or agreed to by the other House, and such other House
rejects or fails to pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the
first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor-General may submit the
proposed law as last proposed by the first-mentioned House, and either
with or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to
the electors in each State and Territory qualified to vote for the
election of the House of Representatives.
(3) When a proposed law is
submitted to the electors the vote shall be taken in such manner as the
Parliament prescribes. But until the qualification of electors of members
of the House of Representatives becomes uniform throughout the
Commonwealth, only one-half the electors voting for and against the
proposed law shall be counted in any State in which adult suffrage
prevails.
(4) And if in a majority of the States a majority of the
electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the
electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to
the Governor-General for the Queen's assent.
(5) No alteration
diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House
of the Parliament, or the minimum number of representatives of a State in
the House of Representatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise
altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the
provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law
unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the
proposed law.
(6) In this section "Territory" means any territory
referred to in Section